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The public's "right to know" has always been a basic tenet of American
political theory. A healthy democracy requires public participation in the for-
mulation and administration of government policy. Full information about
policy proposals and debate over alternatives ensure popular consent. Public
examination of ongoing programs ensures the government's accountability.
Of course, in a country of any size, such tasks can best be performed in a
representative forum. Thus Congress, acting in behalf of the public, should
first direct, and then oversee executive administration.
More recently, however, a competing set of values seems to have received
higher priority. Executive branch officials-especially in the national security
agencies-have consistently sought to insulate their activities from public
scrutiny. With the growing attention to, and presidential conduct of, diplo-
macy and defense policy, "national security" has become a broad cloak under
which public policy is actually made in private. Full disclosure, it has been
suggested, would jeopardize diplomatic, military, and covert intelligence
gathering activities. Accordingly, secrecy has been maintained; efforts to il-
luminate the workings of the executive-whether undertaken by Congress,
the press, or the public-have been resisted.
National security is, of course, a legitimate concern. It does not, however,
provide the blanket justification for secrecy that is claimed by some members
of the executive branch. Rather, it is but one of several considerations to be
weighed against the traditional right of Congress and the public to be ade-
quately informed.
The purpose of this paper is to begin weighing these considerations sys-
tematically. We begin with several premises: that reduced secrecy is vital to
the healthy public debate of national policy; that Congress has, on the whole,
an interest in making information public, just as the executive branch has an
interest in keeping it secret; that both houses of Congress and their commit-
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tees, acting in behalf of the public, are entitled to the information that they
consider necessary for the performance of their constitutional functions.
Thus Congress, we shall argue, must regularize its access to and right to
release national security information. More than that, it must also restructure
the executive branch's classification system. To this end, we shall propose a
legislated classification system through which Congress mandates that certain
kinds of information be made public and creates an effective monitoring role
for the courts-both in ordering disclosure under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act' and in enforcing secrecy by criminal sanctions or injunctive re-
straints.
I
A LEGISLATED CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM
The classification system we propose has several novel elements, not least
of which is that it would be established by legislation rather than by executive
order.
Some may argue that the President can judge better than Congress how
far reform should go. We believe that it is utterly unrealistic to expect the
executive branch to initiate truly effective reform. History teaches that pa-
triotism, idealism, and good character have never been sufficient to generate
a sense of actual bureaucratic responsibility for the release of information. We
believe the missing ingredient to be clear and specific legal norms.
We resisted this approach for some time, as we suspect many readers will,
because we recognized that complex bureaucratic and political problems are
not magically resolved by the establishment of rigid, formal rules. Yet, our
analysis makes it clear that uncontrolled official discretion is central to the
disease, and that curtailment of that discretion must be part of any cure.
When the law sanctifies unbridled executive discretion, or when its standards
are ambiguous and loosely drawn, officials will feel justified in interpreting
the law in a manner that conforms to their own political or bureaucratic in-
terests. If this is true for rules laid down by Congress or the judiciary, it is
even more true for executive orders, such as the one which now authorizes
the classification system.2 This casual attitude has been abetted by the conduct
of presidents themselves, who, from the beginning, have tended to indulge
in impromptu, politically motivated disclosures of ostensibly sensitive infor-
mation.3
In the past, reforms initiated by the executive branch have had little im-
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), as amended b. Pub. L. No. 93-502 §§ 1-3, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974).
2. Exec. Order No. 11652, 3 C.F.R. 339-50 (1974).
3. D. WISE, POLITICS OF LYING 117-18 (1973); M. HALPERIN, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND
FOREIGN POLICY 180 (1974).
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pact; they are unlikely to have greater effect in the future. We believe, how-
ever, that most officials will obey a clear and explicit duty of disclosure, if
sanctioned and supervised by the coordinate branches of government and
supported by public opinion.
Even the limited benefits that might flow from purely internal, executive
sponsored reforms do not appear to be in the offing. In fact, the Ford ad-
ministration seemed essentially satisfied with the existing system, and, if any-
thing, wanted to tighten its control over information by weakening the Free-
dom of Information Act4 and broadening the espionage laws. 5 We realize that
the current administration might bring a somewhat different perspective to
the problem; but we believe that the presidential and bureaucratic interests in
maintaining control over what is released are far stronger than any executive
branch incentive to carry out fundamental changes.
Moreover, from a constitutional perspective, there is much merit in the
idea of congressional involvement. In the aftermath of Vietnam, it has be-
come clear that the diffusion of information about national security is vital to
the constitutional system of checks and balances. This publicity function can-
not safely be entrusted to the discretion of officials who operate from a nar-
row, bureaucratic perspective. The establishment of criteria and procedures
regulating the classification of information is a proper legislative function, as
we shall argue more fully in the next section. Congress has until now dele-
gated that responsibility to the President; we think the time has come for
Congress to reclaim it.
We have stated the case for the principle of a legislated system. It would
be most unfortunate, however, if legislation should copy the biased and am-
biguous criteria of the Executive Order on Classification. 6 Congress has wisely
refrained from enacting proposals along these lines. But no alternative ap-
proach has yet gained general acceptance.
Our own proposal is based upon the principles of specificity and balance.
In brief, it would assign information to one of three categories: (1) automati-
cally released, (2) presumptively classified, and (3) requiring a balance. No
information would be kept secret without an explicit consideration of its po-
tential contribution to enlightened public debate. Moreover, decisions to keep
information secret would be subject to independent scrutiny, both within the
executive branch and by the courts.
4. Letter from Deputy Attorney General Harold R. Tyler, Jr., to Bella S. Abzug, Chairperson,
Government Information and Individual Rights Subcommittee, House Committee on Govern-
ment Operations, March 15, 1976.
5. Statement by President Gerald R. Ford upon establishing a new classification system for
national security information (Exec. Order 11652), 8 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 542 (March 8,
1972) (hereinafter cited as Ford statement accompanying Exec. Order No. 11652).
6. Exec. Order No. 11652, supra note 2.
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We will defend this approach against some crucial objections in the next
section; here we will describe its workings in greater detail. The principles
behind our three broad categories of information can be succinctly stated:
1. Automatically Released Information. Information necessary to Congress'
exercise of its constitutional powers to declare war, to raise armies, to regulate
the armed forces, to ratify treaties, and to approve official appointments must
be made available not only to Congress but to the public.'
Because we do not feel that this principle meets the criteria of specificity
required for effective control, we propose the legislation of specific categories
of information that should routinely be made public. Experience and com-
mon sense, we believe, provide reliable criteria for anticipating the kinds of
decisions that fall into this category; and these criteria should be enacted into
law. Specifically, we would include information relating to: (a) United States
forces engaged in combat or in imminent prospect of combat; (b) United
States forces abroad; (c) nuclear weapons abroad; (d) financing of foreign
operations or foreign military forces; (e) commitments to do (a)-(d) or com-
mencement of negotiations contemplating such commitments; (f) intelligence
organizations: existence, budgets, and functions; (g) weapons systems: con-
cepts and costs; and (h) actions in violation of law.
It is our judgment that Congress may confidently require this information
to be released, without fear of serious injury to the national defense. Beyond
any doubt, the constitutional imperative for making this information public
outweighs any harm that might result.
2. Presumptively Secret Information. There are a few narrow categories of
information-mostly technical-the disclosure of which does not appear use-
ful for public policy debate, and which could be expected to give substantial
assistance to potential adversaries. Such information is entitled to a heavy pre-
sumption of secrecy. Specifically, these categories include: (a) weapons sys-
tems: details of advanced system design and operational characteristics; (b)
details of plans for military operations; (c) details of ongoing diplomatic
negotiations; and (d) intelligence methods: codes, technology, and the identity
of spies.
3. Balancing. Information not in these clear-cut categories should be made
public unless a reasoned judgment is made that the probable costs to national
security clearly outweigh the value of the information for public debate.
7. See also Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae, at 3-14, New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Hearings on Government Information Policies and
Practices Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 818-56
(1971).
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We are ready now for a more detailed look at the items in the first two
categories.
A. Automatically Released Information
1. Americans Engaged in Combat or in Imminent Prospect of Combat
Congress' powers to declare war and to raise funds for the armed forces
are of little practical significance if the President can order armed forces into
combat without even informing Congress. As the Cambodian bombing inci-
dent illustrates, presidents have recently circumvented constitutional proce-
dures by authorizing protracted secret combat operations. In response, Con-
gress has already legislated a stricter requirement for public disclosure in the
War Powers Act.'
We see little risk to national security from this requirement; certainly, an
enemy or potential enemy will ordinarily be aware that United States forces
are engaged in combat against them, or are in a combat zone. In any case, we
believe that the implications of combat activity create a paramount public in-
terest in disclosure.
The designation of military personnel as "advisors" would not avoid a
well-drafted disclosure requirement, since the forces would be in imminent
danger of coming under hostile fire. Nor should the President be permitted
to conduct such operations in secret simply by using civilian employees of the
United States Government or foreign mercenaries. The requirement for dis-
closure should apply whenever the United States is paying the salaries of
those engaged in combat.
Only the fact of combat or introduction of forces would have to be made
public. Details of combat plans and operations could be kept secret.9
2. American Forces Abroad
Congress's power to declare war and the public's right to debate of war
and peace can also be vitiated by the peacetime stationing of United States
forces on the front line, where they will inevitably be drawn into combat if a
war should start. Obviously, the arrival of our forces will not long remain
secret in the area where they are stationed. The deployment and redeploy-
ment of United States troops overseas should be subject, in general terms, to
congressional and public approval.
3. Nuclear Weapons Abroad
The logic of a requirement to report that our forces are stationed in a
particular country would not extend to a public listing of all their military
8. War Powers Act of 1973, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (Supp. IV 1974).
9. We shall not attempt to confront here the technical aspects of drafting legislation that
avoids undesired loopholes.
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equipment. We propose, however, that the President be required to report
publicly the countries in which the United States stores nuclear weapons.
Nuclear weapons are qualitatively different from other explosives. Their
use anywhere would injure humanity in profound and lasting ways. The pres-
ence of nuclear weapons in a particular country not only implies that they
might be used in that country's defense; it also creates a risk of unauthorized
use by the host government, or of seizure by domestic dissidents or invading
forces.
At present, the executive branch admits publicly that it stores more than
seven thousand nuclear weapons in Europe, but declines to identify publicly
the European countries in which such weapons are stored.1 0 In 1975, Secre-
tary of Defense James Schlesinger stated that nuclear weapons were being
stored in Korea." Yet, the executive branch still refuses to indicate if nuclear
weapons are stored elsewhere abroad. Senator Stuart Symington has, at con-
gressional hearings, indicated that United States nuclear weapons are stored
in Greece, Turkey, Korea, and other countries."
Since the United States stores nuclear weapons in special facilities, their
presence in a foreign country is seldom, if ever, a secret from Soviet satellite
reconnaissance. Secrecy on this question seems designed to avoid public de-
bate in the host countries as well as in the United States-a rationale reminis-
cent of the bombing of Cambodia. Such motives as these are simply not suffi-
cient to offset the need for congressional and public debate on the issues
presented by the stationing of nuclear weapons abroad.
4. Financing of Foreign Combat Operations or Foreign Military Forces
The United States transfers military equipment to foreign governments in
a variety of ways, including the military assistance program13 (which can also
include transfers of funds to finance combat operations) and foreign military
sales programs. 4
Congress now requires the President to make public the budget figures
for intended military assistance grants to particular countries. More recently,
Congress, in the Nelson Amendment, has demanded that it receive advance
notice of all proposed sales of military equipment.' 5 Yet, the executive branch
has met this requirement by providing some of the data, including descrip-
10. Baltimore Sun, June 15, 1976, at 2.
11. New York Times, June 26, 1975, at 4.
12. Hearings on Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Before the Subcomm. on Military Applications of the
Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14, 17, 24 (1974).
13. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2321, 2351-2412 (1970), as amended, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2303-2443 (Supp. IV
1974).
14. Id. §§ 2301-2302, 2344-2412.
15. The Nelson Amendment was the third amendment of S. 1443 of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1973. See SENATE COsMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SENATE
CoM,. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, S. REP. No. 37, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1975).
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tions of the equipment, in secret.16 Military assistance can be a prelude to the
use of United States forces. For this reason alone, a requirement of public
disclosure seems appropriate. Moreover, it is difficult to see how such disclo-
sure would harm national security. The ability of recipient governments to
keep the secret is often quite limited and potential enemies are likely to be
well aware of United States involvement. Indeed, for prestige or deterrence
purposes the recipient nation often deliberately makes public its military gifts
from the United States.
The provision of covert assistance to insurgent or irregular forces is a dis-
tinct problem, insofar as such programs could not ordinarily be conducted in
the open. The debate over these activities is not, properly speaking, about
their secrecy, but about the value of engaging in them at all.
5. Commitnents to Do Anv of the Above; Commencement of Negotiations
Contemplating Such Commitments
The Constitution appears to require that all international commitments be
ratified by the Senate. In the modern era, presidents have increasingly made
use of executive agreements to circumvent the formalities of treaty ratifica-
tion. While this procedure may be appropriate in some cases, it would not
appear to be so in the case of commitments which could lead to combat activ-
ity or other equally grave consequences.
For presidents, such informal commitments have considerable appeal-
when the time comes to honor them, Congress may feel bound to stand be-
hind the President's pledge; if not, the United States is not legally liable, and
any charges of bad faith are likely to be leveled at Congress, not at the Presi-
dent. But this technique also has certain drawbacks. These were underlined
by the controversy over aid to South Vietnam in the spring of 1975. The
South Vietnamese plea for military assistance to avert the fall of Saigon was
bolstered by disclosures that, in conjunction with the agreement signed at the
Paris talks in 1972, President Nixon had promised President Thieu that the
United States would respond "with full force" to violations by Hanoi of a
ceasefire. The Ford administration was legally and politically in no position to
send troops or resume bombing in Vietnam, and did not ask Congress for
authority to do so. While pointing to congressional resistance in explanation
of his apparent failure to honor the commitment, the President urged Con-
gress to keep faith with Saigon by approving a request for massive weapons
assistance. When Congress refused, questions were raised about the value of
solemn guarantees from a President of the United States. A timely coordina-
16. A provision of the Foreign Military Assistance Act of 1976, as originally passed by Con-
gress, would have tightened this requirement so as to call for public notice in all cases. See SENATE
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM., INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS EXPORT CONTROL
ACT OF 1976-77, S. REP. No. 876, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
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tion with Congress concerning the existence and interpretation of this com-
mitment would have mitigated the severe embarrassment occasioned by the
episode.
Congress in 1972 required that it be informed of all executive agreements.
Unfortunately, the existing legislation17 permits agreements to be kept secret
from the public whenever the executive so prescribes. We believe that the
arguments for public debate on actual combat activity apply with equal force
at the time of commitments to engage in combat; the same reasoning applies
to commitments to engage in other conduct covered by our mandatory dis-
closure categories. The President and Congress should not keep agreements
secret if they could not properly carry them out in secret. A treaty is law, and
as such it may vitally affect the legal rights and duties of private citizens.
Before any commitment can have this legal effect it must, like the laws passed
in Congress, be duly published. The propriety of doing so at the last moment
may be compared to a hypothetical procedure by which criminal laws would
be secretly made and revealed to the unsuspecting citizen only at the moment
of his arrest. If public debate is to be meaningful, it must be timely.
As soon as the United States enters into diplomatic negotiations which
could lead to a combat commitment, to the stationing of troops abroad, to a
commitment to supply military aid, or to a cessation of hostilities, the fact of
the negotiations should be made public. Should the negotiations end in fail-
ure, that too should be made public.
Indeed, the general tenor of the United States negotiating position iould
often be safely made public as well, but we are not prepared to recommend
that this be required in all cases.
6. Intelligence Organizations: Existence, Budgets, and Functions
Secret operations are an anathema to a democracy. They should be per-
mitted, if at all, only in the most extenuating circumstances. Yet the United
States now has intelligence organizations whose very existence is kept secret
(National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)), whose budget is not made public
(Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)), and whose full range of functions is not
known (NRO, CIA, and National Security Agency).
Our proposal would require that this information be made public, to per-
mit Congress and the public to decide whether the organizations should exist,
what functions they should perform, and how much they should spend.
The Constitution seems to require that budgets be made public: "No
money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropria-
tions made by law, and a regular statement and account of the receipts and
expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time."' The
17. 1 U.S.C. § 112b (Supp. II. 1973).
18. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
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national security does not appear to require that the overall budgets of these
agencies be kept secret. CIA director William Colby has conceded, for exam-
ple, that making public the overall CIA budget would not injure national se-
curity, although he opposed release of the figure on the grounds that it
would generate pressure to release additional data.91
Congress authorized the creation of the CIA and defined its functions in
very general terms. It is clear that Congress believed it was creating an intel-
ligence evaluation organization, and not an agency which would conduct
covert operations abroad or intelligence operations in the United States."'
These latter functions are purportedly authorized by secret directives occa-
sionally issued by the executive. The National Security Agency was created by
a secret presidential directive; it is not known by what means the National
Reconnaissance Office was created.
There does not appear to be any justification for creating organizations in
secret or keeping their functions secret. The Constitution requires congres-
sional authority for the creation of executive agencies, and congressional
oversight of their conduct. The willingness of Congress to delegate these
functions to the President has, until recently, vitiated those responsibilities. In
1975 the CIA admitted to carrying out covert operations abroad, and CIA
Director William Colby detailed the agency's domestic activities. These dis-
closures have permitted an unprecedented and welcome public debate, with-
out visible harm to national security. Similarly, it is well known that the NRO
conducts satellite reconnaissance and that the NSA monitors electronic signals
and attempts to break codes. No harm would result from admitting this
publicly.
7. Weapons Systems-Concepts and Costs
Once a weapons system has been developed and is ready for production, it
may be too late to decide not to deploy it. Often, billions of dollars have
already been spent, and enormous bureaucratic and industrial momentum has
been built up behind the program. Effective congressional and public control
requires timely discussion of proposed new programs.
For example, the fact that the United States was developing MIRVs (mul-
tiple warheads) for its strategic missiles was kept secret for many years, pre-
cluding public debate on what many consider to be an undesirable escalation
of the arms race. By the time the program was made public in 1967, it was
too late for opponents to build the public constituency necessary to stop its
development.
19. Hearings on the Nomination of William E. Colby Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 181 (1973).
20. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CENTRAL INTEL-
LIGENCE AGENCY AS DOCUMENTED IN PUBLISHED CONGRESSIONAL SOURCES (G. Williams ed. 1975).
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Public disclosure would involve only the general outline of the proposed
development and the estimated cost of the system, and not its technical detail.
Such limited disclosure might involve some cost in alerting a potential enemy
to an interesting weapons system,21 but these uncertain costs are far out-
weighed by the clear gains of permitting public debate on such large expendi-
tures of public funds.
8. Actions in Violation of Law
It is, of course, unrealistic to ask the President to supply Congress with a
list of the illegal actions he is undertaking. However, it would not be inap-
propriate to place an obligation upon an official of the executive branch who
learns of unlawful activities to make the information public. For example,
under an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act passed in 1974, Congress
prohibited the conduct of covert operations in foreign countries "other than
those intended solely for obtaining intelligence," unless the President ap-
proved the operation and reported the fact of such operations to the appro-
priate committees of the Congress.2 An official learning of a covert operation
designed for a purpose other than intelligence, or which had not been ap-
proved by the President or reported to Congress, would be obliged to make
the information public.
These listed categories represent an attempt to specify with some economy
the most critical types of information needed by Congress and the public to
participate intelligently in vital decisions on foreign policy and national de-
fense. Upon examination, it is clear that the release of these kinds of informa-
tion would not have any serious detrimental impact on the national security.
It is rarely possible-or even advantageous-to conceal such information from
potential enemies. In the past, the secrecy system has largely operated with
reference to domestic audiences. Any adverse effects of increased disclosure
to foreign governments will be far outweighed by the value of having this
information available to Congress and the public.
B. Presumptively Secret Information
In addition to legislating categories for mandatory disclosure, Congress
should designate certain kinds of information as presumptively secret, because
they are not, in general, important to the public and the Congress, while their
release could have detrimental effects on national security. In any particular
case the presumption of secrecy might be overcome by a showing that there
21. This is a subject of considerable debate in the scientific community. See, e.g., the Seitz
Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Secrecy, July 1970, in Hearings on H.R.
12004 Before the Subcomm. of the House Government Operations Comm., 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 623-42
(1975).
22. 22 U.S.C. § 2442 (Supp. IV 1974).
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was a strong need for the information for public debate on a major issue.
Categories of sensitive information which should be presumptively secret
because of their limited use to the Congress and the public include the follow-
ing four.
23
1. Weapons Systems: Details of Advanced Weapons Systems Design and
Operational Characteristics
One category of such information is already required to be kept secret by
the Atomic Energy Act.24 That Act specifies that information useful in the
manufacture of atomic weapons and other atomic explosive devices should be
classified as restricted data.
Technical characteristics of many non-nuclear weapons systems are quite
sensibly kept secret. Secrecy makes it harder for other countries to manufac-
ture these weapons, to counteract them, or to exploit their vulnerabilities.
Such secrecy need not interfere with the necessary public debate on appropri-
ations measures, provided that enough information is disclosed to establish
the cost and the benefits of the system. 25 Likewise, secrecy need not and
should not interfere with appropriate public participation in the effort to in-
stitute arms control agreements. Like other strategic issues, arms control
proposals involve a complex mixture of technical and political questions.
While official experts inevitably play a leading role, their progress should not
be entirely insulated from public evaluation.
2. Details of Plans for Military Operations
Our scheme would require the United States to reveal that it was engag-
ing in, or about to engage in, military operations against another country. But
the public and Congress need not know the precise operational details in
order to debate the wisdom of planned or current operations. Such informa-
tion could be of great value to a potential opponent.
3. Ongoing Diplomatic Negotiations
Diplomatic negotiations cannot, in many cases, be carried on successfully if
one or both countries continually make public the negotiating positions of
both sides. Public negotiations very quickly turn into propaganda sessions; the
real negotiations, if they survive, occur quietly behind the facade of the for-
23. This list draws from two sources: the ACLU brief in the Pentagon Papers civil suit, supra
note 7, and the Seitz Report, supra note 20. That committee reached the conclusion that a policy
of no secrecy would be most desirable; but since that was not politically feasible, they recom-
mended that secrecy be limited to a few categories.
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2161-2166 (1970).
25. There is a contrary argument made by the Seitz panel, to the effect that keeping such
information secret hinders American research even more than it handicaps potential adversaries.
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mal ones, as in the 1968-1972 Vietnam peace negotiations in Paris. On the
other hand, the Pentagon Papers episode demonstrates that there is a strong
public interest in scrutinizing the competence and sincerity of the negotiating
performance of United States officials. While the beginning of negotiations
should be announced, the positions put forward in the negotiations may
properly be kept secret while the negotiations are under way. The door
should be left open, however, for subsequent public evaluation of the trans-
action.
4. Intelligence Methods: Codes, Technology, and Spies
The details of government information gathering should be kept secret.
That the United States manufactures codes for use in its diplomatic and mili-
tary operations is, of course, no secret. The United States government offi-
cially denies its interception of messages and its attempts to break codes. This
"secret" would be a casualty of our scheme, in that the functions of the Na-
tional Security Agency would have to be made public. There is, however, no
reason why the details of the manufacture of codes, the procedures used to
break codes, or the fact that any particular code has been broken should be
made public.
We have discussed the need for such disclosures about intelligence gather-
ing organizations as will enable the expenditure of public funds to be
evaluated and controlled. There is no need for the public or Congress to
know the precise operational details of such programs as satellite reconnais-
sance or the interception of foreign governmental coin munications. The latter
information is presently protected by statute against unauthorized dis-
closure.
26
The identity of individual spies and other information tending to com-
promise ongoing lawful operations would, of course, be appropriate matter
for secrecy as well.
2 7
26. 18 U.S.C. §§ 798, 952 (1970).
27. A congressional committee has recently made a persuasive case against a rule of absolute,
unqualified secrecy even for such kinds of information as these. The White House at one point in
September 1975 declared it would withhold from the House Intelligence Committee any informa-
tion falling in several categories, including: "The identities of secret agents, sources and persons
and organizations involved in operations which, if disclosed would be subject to personal physical
danger, or to extreme harassment, or to economic or other reprisals"; and "[s]pecific details of
sensitive intelligence methods and techniques of collection." A comnittee spokesman noted that
these stipulations would materially frustrate pending investigations of CIA proprietary companies
and NSA eavesdropping on United States citizens. Moreover, he cited instances in which the
House had successfully demanded the names of secret information sources, in order to evaluate
the credibility of reports that the CIA had failed to follow up. The committee therefore did not
accept the President's guidelines. Instead, the Committee acknowledged a generalized right of the
President to withhold extremely sensitive information from Congress, but only if he could defend
each specific deletion and only subject to judicial review. See Washington Post, Sept. 30, 1975, at
6, col. 1, § A; id. Oct. 1, 1975, at 1, col. 5, § A.
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C. The Middle Category-Balancing
This effort to specify which types of information must be released and
which should be kept secret does not pretend to cover the field of national
security information. Much information will fall, and properly so, into a mid-
dle category requiring case-by-case judgment.2 8 In such cases, a classifying
official would initially attempt to balance the value of disclosure to the public
against the possible harm to the defense or foreign policy of the United
States. Such balancing should proceed on the principle that release is required
unless a reasoned judgment can be made that the probable costs to national
security clearly outweigh the value of the information for public debate.
Having laid down criteria for determining what information should be
made public, we postpone our defense of the mandatory disclosure concept
until the next section. Here, we turn to the task of designing a legislated
system which would effectively implement the suggested criteria. The most
difficult problem is to encourage a responsible exercise of the official discre-
tion applicable to the middle category of information.
D. New Procedures for Classification
Under our proposal, the President would be obliged to publish at stated
intervals a report containing all current information in the categories of re-
quired public release. He would be required to notify Congress publicly as
soon as any change concerning that information occurred.
The classification process would begin with a careful review of any new
document by the responsible official. Any information bearing on national
security would first be so identified. Then it would be determined whether
the information fell into a specific statutory category for automatic release or
presumptive secrecy. If not, the information would be marked for release,
unless the official concluded that release could result in costs to national se-
curity that, even discounted by their improbability, clearly outweigh the value
of the information for public debate.
This three-step determination might be reflected in a corresponding
three-part designator for each item of national security information. The sec-
ond subhead would identify the relevant statutory category, if any; the third
would indicate the appropriate disposition. Typical examples might be:
National Security Information/Combat Activity/Release;
National Security Information/Weapons Design/Withhold; and
National Security Information/None/Release.
28. Some documents may contain matter that is properly kept secret for reasons of "privilege"
unrelated specifically to their national security content; for example, advice to a superior, or
information about an individual's private life. Yet, information covered by our mandatory dis-
closure categories would still have to be released, even if included in a document containing other
information that is privileged.
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For the purpose of determining whether information is to be made public,
only this system of designation would be used. The President would be per-
mitted to establish or maintain additional designations to control distribution
and storage of information that is properly withheld from the public under
the above criteria. The names and meanings of all special designators, how-
ever, would be made public.
New legislation should reinforce the Nixon Executive Order's attempt to
limit the agencies and the number of individuals who can classify information.
It should require a classifier personally to sign the order which classifies the
information, and to specify clearly which specific pieces of information in
each document fit which categories. Where a document has merely copied a
sentence or piece of information that had previously been classified, the new
document must specify the original document, identify the original classifier
as well as the derivative classifier, and indicate clearly which information is
derivatively classified.
Congress should provide for administrative sanctions for willful failure to
follow these procedures. Even more essential, it should provide that no crimi-
nal or administrative sanctions may be imposed on anyone who publicly re-
leases, receives, or possesses information that was improperly withheld from
the public.
Our proposal would also provide for the routine release of all information
three years after classification, unless the head of the agency concerned speci-
fically determines that the information merits reclassification. The decision in
that event, however, would be left to an independent classification review
board.
E. A Classification Review Board
Congress should create an independent Classification Reveiw Board to as-
sist it in overseeing the administration of a legislated classification system. The
agency might be headed by a board of seven members, nominated by the
President and subject to Senate confirmation. They should be appointed for
extended, staggered terms. A number of different functions would be as-
signed to this board, in pursuance of which it would have unqualified access,
by subpoena if necessary, to all national security information.
The board would be notified automatically of all classification decisions
and would be responsible for maintaining an unclassified index of all with-
held information. Provisions for such an index are found in the implementing
directives under the current Executive Order, but the task has not been ac-
complished. Since the criteria and procedures outlined here would lead to a
substantial reduction in the amount of information withheld, indexing would
become substantially easier to carry out.
The Classification Review Board would be responsible for the release of
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information more than three years old. The head of the classifying agency
would be able to apply to the Review Board for extension of the period of
secrecy. If the classifying agency head personally certified that certain infor-
mation must be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign pol-
icy, admittedly the Review Board would be likely to concur. Still, the proce-
dure provides some further protection against bureaucratic abuse.
The Board should also be empowered to seek release of information less
than three years old. Whether acting on its own initiative, on the request of a
member of Congress, or on the appeal of a citizen pursuant to the Freedom
of Information Act,29 the Board would first request reclassification by the
classifying agency and would then make its own review of the agency's dis-
position. In cases under the Freedom of Information Act, the Board's deci-
sion would of course be subject to judicial review. Congress might wish to
provide for judicial review of Board decisions in other instances as well. 30
Another function of the Classification Review Board would be to delete
properly classified information from documents, particularly studies produced
by the intelligence community, and their public release. The Central Intelli-
gence Agency, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the State Depart-
ment, and, to a lesser extent, the intelligence agencies in the Department of
Defense produce many analyses of world events which would be of great
value to Congress and the public. These documents are often classified
merely because they contain a relatively small amount of information obtained
from clandestine sources. In many cases, an unclassified version of these
documents could be produced with a very small amount of effort. At the
present time, there is no staff with either the responsibility or the resources to
perform this function. The Classification Review Board, in cooperation with
the intelligence community, could render a valuable service in this connection.
The Interagency Classification Review Committee established by President
Nixon's Executive Order has had little impact, because it performs in a largely
passive manner and without high visibility. Moreover, its caseload has been
modest and its attitude relatively accepting of the bureaucratic fetish for se-
crecy. We expect that a more independent agency with more initiative and
responsibility would have substantially greater effect.
II
THE ROLE OF THE COURTS
We turn now to a consideration of the role which Congress should assign
to the courts in the new system. We discuss first the Freedom of Information
Act, then espionage and prior restraint.
29. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974); Pub. L. No.
93-579, 88 Stat. 1897 (1974).
30. Below we consider the role in our system of the Freedom of Information Act.
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A. The Freedom of Information Act 31
Under our proposal, the executive branch would be routinely required to
make public certain categories of information. It would be permitted to keep
other information secret only after balancing the public's right to know
against any damage expected to flow from disclosure. Bureaucratic perfor-
mance under these guidelines would be greatly facilitated by conditions of
high visibility. In addition to the independent review board that we have
proposed, a most effective mechanism would be one encouraging the press
and the public to take the initiative in requesting particular information, forc-
ing a timely review of the need for secrecy, first by the classifying agency and
ultimately by the courts.
This mechanism is, of course, already established in the Freedom of In-
formation Act (FOIA). Yet, a number of changes in the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act would flow naturally from adoption of the sort of classification sys-
tem that we propose. The FOIA would have to be amended so that the (b)(1)
exemption for national security information referred to classification criteria
that was established by legislation rather than by executive order.3 2 Legislation
would also be needed to clarify the role of the proposed Classification Review
Board in processing FOIA requests. One possibility would provide for an ap-
peal to the Review Board prior to judicial review, when the agency refuses to
release a requested document. A more expeditious approach would involve
the Board directly in judicial proceedings under the Act. The courts might
wish to call upon the Board from time to time for various sorts of assistance,
such as the location of documents or the provision of expert testimony. How-
ever, it would be counterproductive to compromise the Board's independence
by placing it in the position of representing the interests of the executive
branch in litigation. Even more unfortunate would be the erosion of judicial
independence that might result from excessive reliance on the advice of the
Review Board. Thus any provision for Review Board participation in judicial
proceedings must be drafted with great care.
The most far-reaching consequence of the new classification system for
FOIA litigation would involve no special amendments to the Act itself. It
would flow directly from enactment of the new classification criteria. The
court's first task would now be to determine whether the requested informa-
tion fell into a required disclosure category. If it did, the inquiry would end
there. Otherwise, the court would balance the respective public interests in
secrecy and disclosure-rather than simply evaluating, as under the present
system, the degree of harm that might flow from disclosure.
31. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974); Pub. L. No.
93-579, 88 Stat. 1897 (1974).
32. In that event the (b)(3) exemption relating to information authorized by legislation to be
kept secret would be redundant as far as national security information is concerned.
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We would argue that this new balancing task, far from presenting insu-
perable difficulties, will often be a more congenial task for the courts than is
the judgment required by the current system. The balancing of asserted
governmental interests (e.g., law and order) against the imperatives of free
and full debate is familiar to the courts in the context of first amendment
cases. Often these cases can be disposed of without the need for close analysis
of the governmental interest involved, simply on the strength of the compet-
ing first amendment interest. In FOIA cases, likewise, the court would often
be able to find that the interest in disclosure is entitled to prevail, even if the
harms asserted by the government would in fact come about.
We recognize that cases of some sensitivity will arise from time to time;
but in the context of clearly legislated guidelines the courts will be conceptu-
ally and politically well-equipped to proceed. Indeed, we think the judicial
function has been far more unkindly used by executive attempts to enforce
secrecy by ex parte proceedings, secret evidence, and other departures from
traditional notions of due process."3
B. Criminal Penalties for Disclosure
of Classified Information
The secrecy system has never depended to any significant degree on the
threat of criminal penalties. The Federalists' short-lived experiment with crim-
inal libel trials did not encourage later administrations to do likewise. Until
1911 the United States had no espionage laws at all. The present laws,
3 4
which in essence date from 1917, were directed primarily at outright spying.
Despite some ambiguity in the laws, officials of the Justice Department and
legal advisers of national security agencies did not believe that leaking was a
crime unless there was a specific intent to injure the national defense. Before
1972, espionage indictments were brought only when it could be charged that
information was passed directly to foreign agents. While officials receiving
clearances were routinely warned that unauthorized disclosures could entail
unspecified criminal penalties, these admonitions lacked visibility and credibil-
ity. They had little effect on the conduct of career officials and even less on
that of political appointees.
The indictment of Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo in connection with
the disclosure of the Pentagon Papers marked the first effort to use the es-
pionage laws to punish unauthorized publication.3 5 Although that indictment
33. Constitutional objections to the Freedom of Information Act are discussed in the next
section.
34. 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-798, 952; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2271-2279, 50 U.S.C. App. 781 (1970).
35. Ellsberg was indicted for (among other things) possession of classified government d.4 u-
ments in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 793 and conversion of such documents to his own u~e in
contravention of 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1970). United States v. Russo, Crim. No. 9373-CD-WMB (C.D.
Cal.. filed Dec. 29. 1971).
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bore the taint of Watergate and did not result in a conviction, Justice De-
partment officials continue to assert that it rested on a sound legal basis. Offi-
cials who would release secret information to the press must reckon with the
threat of indictment.
In the context of the present classification system, the claim that all clas-
sified information is protected by criminal sanctions is simply intolerable. The
threat of prosecution, if taken seriously, would have a broad chilling effect on
public debate; this cannot be justified by the goal of preventing serious harm
to national security. To remove the ambiguities that make this threat possible,
Congress should repeal the laws on which the executive branch relies. 36 The
national security would be adequately served, as it has always been, by crimi-
nal laws confined to actual spying.
The objections to criminal penalties for disclosing classified information
would not be quite so overwhelming if Congress adopted a new classification
system such as the one we propose. Nevertheless, we have serious reservations
both as to the need for such penalties and as to their impact. The nation
survived two world wars and the Cold War without sweeping restrictions on
public debate; we see no need in this period of detente for a new "Official
Secrets Act."
Certainly there should not be criminal penalties for any and all disclosures
of classified information. Even under a vastly improved classification system,
there will be many difficult decisions and many opportunities for official
error. The threat of prosecution for misclassification or for leaking will not
encourage careful and objective judgments. Instead, it will perpetuate the
timid, self-protective attitude that now prevails. Frequent prosecutions would
surely dull both public debate and bureaucratic efficiency, while occasional
and selective enforcement would undermine the credibility of deterrence and
invite charges of politically motivated discrimination.
A better case can be made for criminal sanctions limited to the release of
information designated by law as presumptively classified. Atomic energy and
cryptographic information, in particular, are relatively narrow and well-
defined categories. We think this highly technical information can be strictly
protected without serious danger of interference with public debate. Criminal
laws for this purpose already exist; they have rarely if ever been invoked and
we see no urgent need to change them. Nevertheless, we would not recom-
mend extending this approach to our other categories of presumptively clas-
sified information. Cases will inevitably arise where information that arguably
falls into a presumptively classified category is essential for legitimate public
debate. The social cost of deterring disclosure in such cases outweighs the
limited contribution to national security that criminal penalties would make.
36. We refer, in particular, to 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d), 793(e) (1970).
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Enforcement must always be evenhanded. If there are to be criminal sanc-
tions for disclosure of presumptively classified information, there must also be
criminal penalties for withholding information that Congress has designated
for release. Surely the threat of prosecution is a crude and ineffective tech-
nique for compelling disclosure of such information. Officials will not expect
the Justice Department to prosecute unless public opinion is very much
aroused. Yet if Congress and the public are vigorous in demanding release of
needed information and condemning those who resist, it will not be necessary
to resort to criminal penalties. The Freedom of Information Act now provides
for administrative sanctions in cases of flagrant overclassification; Congress
could easily provide administrative sanctions for irresponsible disclosure as
well. We think this a more credible and appropriate approach than criminal
penalties to the problem of evenhanded enforcement of a new classification
system. Criminal penalties may safely be reserved for cases of outright spying,
as in fact they have been ever since Jefferson's day.
It cannot be overstressed that the most effective protection for legitimate
secrets would come from a rebirth of respect for the classification system,
brought about by a stripping away of unnecessary secrecy. As Mr. Justice
Stewart put it in the Pentagon Papers case:3 7
[W]hen everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the system be-
comes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless, and to be manipu-
lated by those intent on self-protection or self-promotion. I should suppose,
in short, that the hallmark of a truly effective internal secority system would
be the maximum possible disclosure, recognizing that secrecy can best be pre-
served only when credibility is truly maintained.
C. Prior Restraints
As the Supreme Court emphasized in the Pentagon Papers case, proposals
for prior restraint come before the courts bearing a heavy presumption
against their constitutionality. When the first Congress approved the Bill of
Rights, the first amendment's injunction against laws abridging freedom of
the press was explicitly directed at schemes for prior censorship on publica-
tion. Indeed, we think a persuasive case could be made for the proposition
that all prior restraints on publication are unconstitutional.3 8
The nation has survived for nearly two hundred years without resorting to
formal prior restraints. Even in wartime, voluntary press self-censorship was
found sufficient to protect the national security. In the Internal Security Act
of 1950,3 9 the high point of Cold War anti-subversive legislation, Congress
37. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring).
38. See generally the discussions listed in I T. EMERSON, D. HABER, & N. DORSEN, POLITICAL
AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 64 (1976), and the concurring opinions of Justice Black
and Douglas in the Pentagon Papers case, and the cases cited therein, 403 U.S. at 714-20, 720-24.
39. Ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987 (1950-1951).
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stated flatly that nothing in the Act should be read as authorizing prior re-
straints.40 Only in the Atomic Energy Act did Congress make provision for
court injunctions against disclosure. 41 That very narrow provision has never
been invoked, and its constitutionality remains to be tested in court.
Despite the absence of legislative backing for prior restraints, the executive
branch has recently made two bold attempts to enjoin publication of national
security information. In the Pentagon Papers case the Supreme Court, while
denying the requested injunction, intimated that such an order would be ap-
propriate if the government could prove that publication would inevitably
cause direct, immediate, and irreparable harm to the national security.
42
If Congress adopts a new classification system, including presumptive se-
crecy for specific kinds of information, the executive branch may well assert
that all such information has been determined by Congress to meet the Su-
preme Court's standard for prior restraints. Yet, the argument for presump-
tive secrecy is not that disclosure would necessarily be disastrous; it is simply
that the information is of little value to the public and of some value to
foreign governments. We believe that very little of this information, in fact,
meets the Supreme Court's rigorous test. To remove all doubt, a new classifi-
cation act should expressly disclaim any intent to authorize prior restraints.
Before the Marchetti decision, the congressional hands-off attitude toward
prior restraints seemed satisfactory. In that case, however, the Court of Ap-
peals upheld a permanent injunction, requiring Marchetti to submit all his
writings to the CIA so that classified information could be deleted. 43 The
court justified this wholly unprecedented order by invoking secrecy agree-
ments Marchetti signed during his tenure as a CIA official. Congress has not
authorized such agreements, much less the sweeping waiver of first amend-
ment rights they are now said to entail. We think Congress should act to limit
the impact of secrecy agreements, exercising its power to regulate the terms
of government employment. 44
The guidelines we would recommend flow naturally from the approach
that has been adopted in this paper. Because of the special constitutional
status of prior restraints, the degree of threatened harm must, of course, be
exceedingly great before such action can be justified. Mr. Justice Stewart's
standard of "direct, immediate and irreparable damage' 45 is strict enough in
40. Id. § l(b).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2280 (1970).
42. This is a paraphrase of Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion now generally cited as reflecting the
view of a majority of the Court; see New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 730.
43. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). See
also Knopf v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
44. A bill to overturn Marchetti was introduced by Rep. Bingham in July 1975; see 121 CONG.
REc. H7167 (daily ed. July 21, 1975).
45. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concu'rring).
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this respect, provided, as Mr. Justice Brennan urged, that the Court must be
persuaded that the harm will result before it grants even a temporary re-
straining order.46 We submit, in addition, that the courts should be required
to balance the expected harm, however great, against the value of the infor-
mation to the public. It seems to us that the first amendment requires no less.
This concludes the presentation of our proposals. Although they are based
on principles already implicit in the congressional reforms of recent years,
our proposals would radically transform the current classification system.
That system rests on executive order; it does not allow independent review;
its standards are vague; it does not require any information to be made pub-
lic, or even any consideration of the public's need to know; it is supported by
biased and potentially repressive sanctions; and finally, its irrationality has dis-
sipated its authority to the extent that legitimate secrets are believed by many
to be inadequately protected. Our system is designed to cure each of these
defects.
The scheme we propose will strike some as dangerous; others may doubt
that it goes far enough. Finally, there are sure to be claims that it is uncon-
stitutional. We think that all of these objections are mistaken. We believe that
our proposed system would greatly improve the flow of information to Con-
gress and the public, without causing undue prejudice to the national security
or the constitutional prerogatives of the executive branch. We discuss these
issues in the concluding section.
Ill
THE PROPOSED SYSTEM
OBJECTIONS, DANGERS, & OPPORTUNITIES
The executive branch has always resisted proposals to curb the secrecy
system by legislative action. It has used both legal and pragmatic arguments to
persuade Congress and the public that legislative reforms would be unwork-
able and improper. There is every reason to expect that our own proposals
will meet with similar objections. Thus it may be helpful to explain why we
find them unpersuasive.
A. The Constitutional Argument
The modern growth of presidential power has required corresponding in-
novations in constitutional doctrine. Recent Presidents have sponsored a re-
markable development in the theory of implied or inherent presidential
powers-powers that are not expressly granted by the Constitution, but are
said to be justified by necessity. Originally, such powers were invoked in
emergencies that arose when Congress was not in session, with the under-
46. 403 U.S. at 727 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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standing that congressional approval would be sought as soon as possible. Re-
cently, however, it has become fashionable to claim that the exercise of inher-
ent presidential powers is immune to congressional or judicial interference.
The executive branch is likely to insist, therefore, that the Constitution pro-
hibits Congress from legislating a classification system that includes manda-
tory disclosure requirements; and that it prohibits the courts, with or without
congressional approval, from reviewing executive secrecy decisions.
Certainly the Constitution itself does not support these assertions. The
enumerated presidential powers respecting national security are these:
47
The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into the
actual service of the United States.
He shall have power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur; and he
shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall
appoint ambassadors....
[H]e shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers.
Congress, meanwhile was expressly granted the following powers: 48
To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules con-
cerning captures on land and water;
To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use
shall be for a longer term than two years;
To provide and maintain a navy;
To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval
forces;
To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union,
suppress insurrections and repel invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for
governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United
States, reserving to the States respectively, the appointment of the officers,
and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed
by Congress.
These provisions, taken together, necessarily imply independent but con-
current efforts by the respective branches on behalf of national security in-
terests. In case of disagreement, leaders in each branch can and will attempt
to marshal public support for their respective views. They may also claim that
their opponents are not only mistaken as to policy, but are usurping a func-
tion that is not theirs to perform.
1. The Role of Congress
Although Congress since 1793 has steadfastly asserted its right to publish
the confidential information it obtains, the executive branch continues to dis-
47. U.S. CONST. art. 1I, §§ 2, 3.
48. Id. art. 1. 8.
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pute that principle. The right of Congress to compel production of informa-
tion by the executive branch has also been periodically contested, again with-
out definitive result. As Madison pointedly observed in connection with the
Jay Treaty dispute, neither Congress nor the President can unilaterally decide
constitutional questions for the government and the nation as a whole. 49
Today the Supreme Court does possess this power. 5° However, it has de-
cided very few cases relating to the allocation of national security powers
among the branches, and even fewer relating to control of government in-
formation. Such questions are seldom presented directly in litigation between
private parties or between a private party and the government as a whole. In
these contexts, executive acts are usually claimed to have been authorized or
ratified by Congress, and the Court has preferred not to scrutinize too closely
this image of cooperative decision-making. Thus the Court has held that con-
gressional approval may properly be given in very general terms, may be im-
plicit rather than direct, and may take place after the fact. These decisions
have legitimized the historical accretion of national security powers to the
presidency-a development the Court surely has not been in a position to
contain.
Since the Civil War the Commander in Chief clause5 1 has emerged as an
important source of presidential power, and it is now conceded that he may,
even without specific congressional authority, employ military force, at least
when United States territory or forces are under attack; create executive of-
fices necessary to prosecute a war; issue regulations affecting industry and
labor in wartime; requisition property in a theatre of war; establish proce-
dures for military government in occupied territory, and end hostilities by
armistice.
2
At the same time, the Senate's failure to establish for itself an active role in
diplomacy has left the President as the sole organ for negotiating with foreign
governments. In this capacity he can grant recognition to foreign govern-
ments; appoint personal agents (including secret agents) to gather informa-
tion; negotiate, interpret and terminate treaties; and negotiate executive
agreements.51
The rationale for these implied powers has been that unity and rapid deci-
sion was necessary for the effective conduct of war and diplomacy. While the
Court and the nation have agreed that Presidents need not wait for congres-
49. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 772 (1976).
50. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974), reaffirming Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) that "(i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial depart-
ment to say what the law is."
51. U.S. CONsT. art. 1I, § 2.
52. See generally E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1957, at 227-62 (4th
ed. 1957).
53. See generally id. at 170-226.
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sional action before taking emergency measures, it does not follow, and the
Court has never held, that an emergency justifies action that is flagrantly il-
legal, or that is kept secret once the immediate crisis is past.
Indeed, the Court has repeatedly made it clear that the President's emer-
gency powers are limited by the concurrent powers of the other branches
and by the Bill of Rights. In the last analysis, it remains the province of Con-
gress to make the law and that of the Court to ensure that constitutional
limitations are observed.
5 4
The claim that Congress may not legislate limits on presidential national
security powers is not supported by precedent. A careful review of Supreme
Court decisions shows that only the pardon power and the power to fire pres-
idential appointees have been accorded a measure of immunity from legisla-
tive interference.
55
The Court has never held a congressional act to be unconstitutional on the
ground that it infringed upon the President's powers as Commander in Chief
or as agent of foreign policy. Instead, the Court has repeatedly held that once
Congress addresses itself to a particular national security problem, the Presi-
dent is bound by the legislation and is not free to pursue alternative measures
that are more to his liking.
5 6
The cases most often cited in support of presidential claims to inherent or
exclusive national security powers57 do show that the President may take sub-
stantial initiatives on his own where Congress has established no specific re-
strictions; and that the President and Congress, acting together, have ample
powers-always limited by the Bill of Rights-to do what the national security
requires. These cases do not discuss, and certainly in no way limit the power
of Congress to establish guidelines and procedures for the conduct of the
executive branch.
Presidents themselves have recognized the propriety and usefulness of
congressional participation in the secrecy system. They have sought and ob-
tained special legislation protecting atomic energy 5 8 intelligence,5 9 and cyp-
54. The applicability of the Bill of Rights to national security powers is confirmed by such
cases as United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S
144 (1963); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdall, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Hamilton v. Kentucky
Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146 (1919).
55. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128
(1871).
56. The leading modern case in point is the Steel Seizure case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (see especially the quite incisive concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Jackson).
57. See Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Hirabayshi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936);
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2271-2282 (1970).
59. 50 U.S.C. §§ 403(d)(3), 40 3g (1970).
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tographic secrets, 6 ° and more recently have proposed additional legislation
protecting classified information in general. 6 1 If Congress may legislate for
secrecy, surely it may legislate for publicity as well.
2. The Roles of the Courts
In vetoing the 1974 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act,
President Ford asserted that the provision for de novo judicial review of se-
curity classifications is unconstitutional. 6 This assertion was not backed by
supporting argument, and Congress did not find it persuasive. Nevertheless,
we will undertake a brief survey of the applicable case law, to see what au-
thority can be mustered for the President's view.
It is true that the courts have no explicit constitutional role in making
national security policy. That function is assigned to the popularly elected,
"political" branches of government. This legal principle is augmented by polit-
ical realities, for the courts have been aware that they could be permanently
damaged by accusations of irresponsible meddling in national security affairs
-not to mention charges of deliberate subversion.
Thus the courts have been most reluctant to sit in judgment upon matters
of national security policy, or to become involved in disputes between Con-
gress and the President. Moreover, the courts have exercised substantial re-
straint in reviewing factual determinations by Congress or the President that
relate to national security. Corwin has summarized the scope of this principle
as follows:
6 3
On this principle the Court has subsequently held at one time or another
that it must accept as final and binding on itself the determinations of one or
other or both of "the political departments," with respect to all such questions
as whether a certain newly constituted community was a qualified belligerent
at international law; what was the correct boundary of a certain country; what
country was the sovereign of a particular region; whether a certain commu-
nity was entitled to be considered as a "belligerent" or as an independent
state; who was the dejure, who the defacto ruler of a certain country; whether
a particular person was a duly accredited diplomatic agent to the United
States; how long a military occupation of a certain region should continue in
order to fulfill the terms of a treaty; whether a certain treaty was in effect;
and so on.
This commitment to self-restraint, however, has never entailed an abdica-
tion of what the Court sees as its essential functions. The Court has always
reserved the power to balance governmental interests, however urgent,
against the fundamental rights of citizens; and the Court has steadfastly re-
fused to relinquish its own control over the conduct of judicial proceedings.
60. 18 U.S.C. §§ 793, 952 (1970).
61. Ford statement accompanying Exec. Order No. 11652, supra note 5.
62. 10 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1318 (Oct. 17, 1974).
63. E. CoRwIN, supra note 51, at 177.
(Vol. 40: No. 3
Page 132: Summer 1976]
The judicial temper is well illustrated by a recent case in which the gov-
ernment argued that the supervision of national security wiretaps was beyond
judicial competence. To this attack on fourth amendment rights the Court
responded vigorously: "If the threat is too subtle or complex for our senior
law enforcement officers to convey its significance to a court, one may ques-
tion whether there is probable cause for surveillance."6 4 In one line of cases
the Court has considered the extent of its own power, in the absence of
statutory guidelines, to compel the executive branch to supply evidence
needed in court proceedings.
65
The Court has treated gingerly the issue of whether the executive resis-
tance to disclosure was based on national security concerns, or simply on a
generalized policy of confidentiality for high-level executive deliberations. De-
spite the Court's respectful language and its careful avoidance of confronta-
tion whenever possible, the Court has maintained the position that executive
claims of privilege are not automatically binding. The courts themselves must
balance the need for secrecy against the litigating parties' need for the infor-
mation.
In four cases, the Court drew back from ordering disclosure of national
security information; these were the Totten, Waterman, Reynolds, and Mink
cases. Totten concerned Union spying activities during the Civil War.
Waterman, decided in 1948, involved the licensing of foreign operations for
United States air carriers. Reynolds dealt with the crash of an airplane carrying
secret electronic equipment; while Mink involved nuclear weapons testing. In
none of these cases did the Court recognize a constitutional limitation on its
power to demand the information. In Reynolds, the privilege to withhold "state
secrets" was expressly stated to rest on judicial discretion. 66 The secrecy in-
volved in Totten was at least indirectly authorized by law, in that Congress had
long exempted the President's secret service expenditures from the usual
budgetary disclosure requirements. Congress has also been especially solici-
tous to protect the kinds of information involved in Waterman, Reynolds, and
Mink.
In fact, the Court said explicitly in both Waterman and Mink that its holding
was simply an interpretation of legislative intent. 67 In Waterman, it held that
Congress did not intend to authorize judicial review and that this policy was
64. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 320 (1972).
65. These cases are: United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73
(1973); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); Chicago & S. Air-Lines, Inc. v. Watermann
Steamship Co., 333 U.S. 103 (1948); Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 105 (1876); Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803); United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 55 (No. 14,692),
187 (No. 14,694) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
66. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8 (1953).
67. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 74, 80 (1973); Chicago & S. Air-Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steam-
ship Co., 333 U.S. 103, 104 (1948).
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constitutionally permissible. It was clearly implied that Congress could also
have made the opposite choice without offending against any constitutional
limitation. In Mink, the issue was the intent of Congress in passing the 1967
Freedom of Information Act. While holding that judicial review of security
classifications had not been contemplated, the Court expressly invited Con-
gress to legislate new disclosure guidelines if it saw fit. The Court certainly
did not suggest that any provision for judicial review would be unconsti-
tutional.
68
It is easy to appreciate the value of a clear congressional mandate and
legislated guidelines to assist the delicate function of judicial review of na-
tional security matters. The implementation of legislated guidelines is a far
more congenial task, both politically and intellectually, than the independent
development of judicial standards for balancing secrecy and disclosure values.
Nothing in the case law, therefore, remotely suggests that the Freedom of
Information Act is unconstitutional, or that our proposals for further amend-
ment would make it so. When officials oppose reforms that will disrupt estab-
lished routine, they invariably argue that the government will be paralyzed by
the plan. This bureaucratic shibboleth has not yet been elevated by the Court
to the status of a constitutional principle.
Indeed, President Ford did not attempt to argue that the courts can play
no role whatever in the secrecy system. The executive branch wishes to retain
the option of seeking judicial aid in enforcing secrecy; but if the courts are
competent to judge the need for secrecy, surely they may judge the need for
publicity as well. In fact, President Ford conceded that it would be proper for
a court to review a classification decision in order to decide whether it was
reasonable. If so, we do not see how the Constitution can be said to prohibit
the courts from going on to inquire whether a "reasonable" classification deci-
sion was, in fact, correct. That is all the new FOIA provision for de novo
review accomplishes. While the formula preferred by the President might re-
sult in a somewhat smaller number of judicially-ordered disclosures, it would
not affect the basic quality of the proceedings. The evidence and the scope of
the court's inquiry would be essentially the same; any difference could hardly
rise to constitutional significance. Once we recognize the propriety of some
judicial participation in the secrecy system, the mode of that participation be-
comes a political and not a constitutional question.
We may now summarize the key constitutional questions, and our re-
sponses, as follows:
First, how much secrecy does the Constitution permit or require? There is
no specific constitutional language to help us here. The framers foresaw and
68. A similar approach, inviting Congress to provide for judicial review of deportation deci-
sions, was taken in Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
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accepted the recurring tension between the needs for open communication
and broad participation, on the one hand, and for military and diplomatic
secrecy on the other. They saw too that the proper balance between these
values would depend on shifting circumstance. Thus they shunned a rigid
constitutional formula in favor of the principle of responsible discretion.
Second, who is to exercise this discretion: does the Constitution reserve
this function to the executive branch alone? The emphatic answer is that each
branch has a role to play. While Congress and the courts have usually ac-
cepted presidential leadership in national security affairs, they have carefully
guarded their respective powers to intervene on their own behalf and on be-
half of the public. Neither the text of the Constitution nor the interpretations
evolved by the Supreme Court have designated the protection of national
security as an exclusive function of the executive. By the same token, safe-
guarding the democratic political process is not a function committed to the
exclusive care of the executive branch. Publicity fosters the right to vote and
to participate in political life; these concerns are well within the spheres of
congressional and judicial competence.
Third, can Congress legislate a classification system, and provide for judi-
cial review of classification decisions? There is nothing in history or the case
law to suggest otherwise. While the founding fathers did not resort to mea-
sures like these, they were not confronted with the modern phenomenon of a
bureaucratic secrecy system. It is that phenomenon, we have argued, that
makes a legislated disclosure system peculiarly appropriate. Such proposals
are new, and their constitutionality has not been authoritatively determined.
While the Supreme Court has affirmed that presidential discretion in national
security affairs is entitled to very great respect, it has also insisted that this
discretion is limited by the powers of Congress, the rights of citizens, and the
integrity of the judicial process. Nothing in the cases suggests, therefore, that
Congress cannot legislate new guidelines for withholding and releasing na-
tional security information; nothing in them raises a constitutional obstacle to
judicial enforcement, mandated by Congress, of such guidelines.
B. Pragmatic Objections: The Proposed System in Operation
There can be little disagreement, we think, with the ultimate aim of our
proposals: to enhance the quality of public debate and of the resulting
policies, while at the same time providing due protection for legitimate se-
crets. It remains to be demonstrated that our proposals are well-designed to
accomplish this aim-that in practice there would be neither far too much
disclosure nor far too little. To show this, we must be more specific about the
way our proposed classification system would actually operate. We shall con-
sider in turn each of the three broad categories of classification: mandatory
disclosure; presumptive secrecy; and the middle, balancing category.
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1. Mandatory Disclosure
The proposal to require automatic disclosure of certain categories of in-
formation is certain to be criticized for its rigidity. In our view, this rigidity is
essential. We showed in Part I how secrecy frustrates congressional and public
participation in the making of defense and foreign policy. We showed why
the executive branch cannot be relied on to release voluntarily the informa-
tion needed for public debate, and we argued the constitutional case for a
more open system.
The mandatory disclosure categories are intended to ensure that certain
decisions vitally and directly affecting the general welfare will be made in a
constitutionally acceptable manner. Without question, Congress has the right
and the responsibility to participate in basic decisions affecting war and peace,
to regulate public spending, and to oversee the activities of the executive
branch. The attempt to perform these functions through informal and volun-
tary cooperation may have succeeded in happier times; in our time it has
conspicuously failed. History shows that executive secrecy is not adequately
controlled by means of internal self-discipline. We think legislation is the only
promising alternative.
The War Powers Act already requires public reporting of United States
combat activities. 69 Our proposals constitute a selective extension of that ap-
proach, calculated to guarantee that there will be timely public debate on is-
sues of primary importance. The identification of those issues and the initia-
tion of debate cannot safely be left to official discretion. It is appropriate and
essential that Congress designate in advance the kinds of information whose
release is of great public value, yet not threatening to national security.
Our mandatory disclosure categories are limited to just such kinds of in-
formation. We would not recommend extending the approach to cover the
entire domain of information that is not presumptively secret, for the costs of
such wholesale disclosure would almost surely outweigh the benefits. Yet it is
possible that a few additional mandatory disclosure categories could be jus-
tified. Our proposals focus on the problem of secret warmaking, brought so
sharply to public attention by events of the last decade. Perhaps other, less
obvious kinds of issues deserve equal priority. One advantage of the legislative
process is the opportunity it affords for careful consideration of aspects of an
issue that may have been overlooked at first. That is precisely why we favor a
legislated solution.
It remains to evaluate the impact of mandatory disclosure rules on official
behavior. We have no doubt that officials by and large would comply with
routine disclosure requirements. Periodic reports submitted to Congress or
69. 50 U.S.C. § 1543 (Supp. III 1973).
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published in the Federal Register are an established feature of the scene. Such
requirements are always resented at first, but they tend to be rapidly assimi-
lated into the bureaucratic routine.
The more nagging questions relate to the operation of our system in a
crisis situation. In moments of grave danger, would our system deprive the
nation of the ability to act with "vigor, secrecy and despatch?
°7 0
One approach to an answer is to consider the application of our categories
to various historical situations. Speculations of this kind are admittedly some-
what artificial; but we think they show that sharp conflicts between our man-
datory disclosure categories and essential security interests are unlikely to
arise.
2. The World War II Period
It appears, for example, that our proposals would have had little impact
on the course of events in the years prior to World War II. The main reason
is that secrecy did not play a critical role in those events. President Roosevelt's
freedom of action was constrained at that time by a neutrality policy that
Congress had enacted into law. The President had objected to this legislation
on the ground that its inflexibility could prove disastrous; nevertheless, he
signed the bill into law. To the extent that he later judged it necessary to take
steps that departed from the strict letter of neutrality, he took them openly.
Although it was consummated without prior congressional authorization, the
destroyer deal of 1940 was in no sense a secret.
It may be that Roosevelt was less than candid about his hopes for early
United States involvement in the war. This is unfortunate, but we do not
propose to legislate the disclosure of thoughts and sentiments. Our proposals
apply to actions and formal decisions, and these the President did not conceal.
Insofar as we approve of Roosevelt's far-sighted leadership, we may be
assured that our disclosure requirements would not have hindered it. At the
same time, his success in openly circumventing the will of Congress serves as a
reminder that publicity is not a panacea. Our proposals are designed to stimu-
late public debate; the rest is left to the workings of the political process.
The conduct of the war itself of course involved a number of important
military and diplomatic secrets. Most of this secrecy raised no constitutional
difficulties. Indeed, most of the wartime secrets fall squarely within our pro-
tected categories. Our proposals are not intended to interfere with the suc-
cessful prosecution of a constitutionally initiated war and we cannot perceive
any danger that they would do so.
70. This phrase was often used by the framers in describing the advantages of a strong execu-
tive; See I M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 70, 112, 140, 144
(1937).
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3. The Post-War Period
In the post-war period, many things were done in secret that under our
proposals would have had to be disclosed. That, of course, is the main point
of our proposals. We recognize, however, that in some cases disclosure would
have made little difference. This applies especially to the covert interventions
in various countries before the Bay of Pigs. Most of these operations could
perhaps have been performed openly without major foreign or domestic op-
position; in any case we think public debate on the appropriateness of such
operations would have been highly beneficial.
With respect to the course of events in Indochina, the impact of full dis-
closure would probably have been far more significant, because our opera-
tions there were more controversial and were extended over longer periods of
time. If some of the critical information in the Pentagon Papers had been
public from the beginning, our involvement might never have reached the
point of actual combat. On the other hand, it is possible that the public would
have continued to support administration policy indefinitely if not for the
emergence of the "credibility gap." Of two things we are certain, however.
First, the disclosures required by our proposals would not have given foreign
governments any significant information they did not already have. Second,
secrecy was a crucial factor in the loss of trust between the government and
the public that developed in this period. That development was far more
costly to our society than any damage that public debate could possibly have
done.
Without the gift of prophecy, there is no way to prove absolutely that our
proposals will never have any adverse effect on the national security. We
would point out, however, that the most important restraint on presidential
power is one that Congress has already seen fit to impose, in the form of the
War Powers Resolution.7 1 That measure has already contributed to a some-
what more open style in executive decision-making, without noticeable harm
to the national security. 2 In fact, the Mayaguez episode illustrates that the
presidency has retained an ample-indeed a dangerous-degree of the "flexi-
bility" that crises are said to demand. We have argued that the reforms of
recent years do not go far enough. Our proposals are a measured extension of
those reforms, and we do not think that they go too far.
The principle of unrestrained official discretion has been discredited by
history. A mandatory disclosure system, limited in scope to information that
the public urgently requires, would be administratively workable, consistent
with the national security interest, and constitutionally superior.
We are persuaded that it would be a terrible mistake to provide for excep-
71. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (Supp. III 1973).
72. See text supra at notes 9-11.
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tions to the automatic disclosure requirements. We grant that a situation
could conceivably someday arise in which compliance would be utterly disas-
trous. If the President' made such a determination in a responsible manner,
we are confident the country would understand it. In a sense, every law con-
tains an unwritten exception for such occasions. On the other hand, to pro-
vide expressly for exceptions would simply invite wholesale evasion of the
disclosure requirements themselves. This has already occurred in the case of
the "automatic" declassification procedures of the executive order, 73 as well as
the Church amendment's provision for public reporting of executive agree-
ments.7 4 It would be far better to shorten the list of disclosure categories than
to eviscerate the entire system in this manner.
4. Presumptive Secrecy
The proposal that Congress designate certain kinds of information as pre-
sumptively secret is scarcely novel. Congress has already legislated special pro-
tection for atomic energy information and cryptographic information. We
propose to extend this approach to a few other areas in which secrecy is un-
likely to prejudice the public interest.
Some controversy is possible respecting one of our categories, namely that
of weapons design. As we noted earlier,7 5 respected scientists have argued
that secrecy in this area actually inhibits the development of our own technol-
ogy far more than it obstructs the research efforts of other nations. We do
not feel equipped to evaluate this argument, but expect that Congress would
wish to do so very carefully.
As was true for our automatic disclosure categories, we anticipate that
others may propose additions to our list of presumptive secrets. We are open
to such suggestions and confident that Congress would have ample oppor-
tunity to consider them.
Whatever the list may ultimately contain, the logic of our analysis requires
some provision for disclosure of information in the presumptively secret
categories. No matter how narrowly the categories are drawn, instances are
apt to arise where the case for disclosure is exceptionally compelling. This
could occur, for instance, in connection with debate over arms control pro-
posals or with oversight of actions in the intelligence community. If Congress
enacts a flat rule of secrecy that could cover such situations, the executive
branch will certainly not waive it under these circumstances.
We recognize that this position is in contrast with our unwillingness to
provide for similar exceptions to the automatic disclosure categories. The two
situations are not symmetrical, because the incentive structure of the executive
73. Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1974).
74. Pub. L. No. 92-403, § 1, 86 Stat. 619 (codified at I U.S.C. § 1126 (Supp. IV 1974).
75. See note 22 supra.
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branch is not symmetrical. In the case of disclosure requirements, any excep-
tion would be sure to swallow the rule. No such danger is evident with respect
to a rule of presumptive secrecy.
5. The Middle Category: Balancing in Practice
To justify the existence of a middle category should not require extended
discussion. While we have argued at length against the system of unlimited
official discretion, we do not believe that such discretion can or should be
entirely eliminated. The designation by law of mandatory disclosure and pre-
sumptive secrecy categories is an appropriate way of dealing with a few
specific kinds of information. Those are cases where the balance between the
values of secrecy and disclosure can meaningfully be determined in advance,
without reference to particular circumstances. However, the attempt to assign
all national security information to one or the other of these categories would
be extremely unrealistic and counterproductive. In most cases, a national de-
cision will require a sensitive weighing of the requirements of national se-
curity and of public debate in the particular situation. The initial weighing
must be left to responsible officials of the executive branch. Yet careful provi-
sion for the guidance of those officials is clearly essential.
In the past, the executive branch has not been accustomed to taking re-
sponsibility for the interest in public debate. That interest has not been cen-
tral to the political environment in which the national security bureaucracy
operates; nor has it been emphasized by the formal rules that apply to secrecy
decisions. The Executive Order on Classification does not instruct officials to
balance the need for publicity against the need for secrecy; rather, their task
is simply to determine whether secrecy would serve the national security in-
terest. In practice, it appears that public debate has been regarded as inher-
ently prejudicial to the national security, and that documents have consciously
been classified, under color of law, for the express purpose of preventing
public debate.
It was not so long after Watergate that a staff official of the National




In addition, knowledge that the United States had undertaken a study of a
particular issue could arouse the interest of special-interest groups in the
United States which could mount a lobbying effort in the Congress and else-
where in an effort to influence the outcome of the study and the decision or
its recommendations. This could interfere seriously with the objective, dispas-
76. Affidavit of Jeane W. Davis, in Halperin v. Nat'l Security Council, Civil No. 75-0675
(D.D.C., filed July 25, 1975). Ms. Davis later added that "[t]he publication of the decision making
process of the President in the area of foreign policy would have an adverse effect upon the
President's ability to act effectively in the area of foreign policy and is thus prohibited by the
preamble of Executive Order 11652 and Section I of the Order." Response to Interrogatories,
Oct. 20, 1975.
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sionate atmosphere in which these issues are analyzed and presented to the
President and could have an inhibiting effect on the candor and completeness
of the information and advice essential to the President in carrying out his
responsibilities and, indeed, on the President's flexibility in dealing with the
issue.
Our proposals would reverse this presumption that public debate is a
dangerous and inappropriate process, and would establish a rule that infor-
mation should be made public unless a convincing case can be made for with-
holding it from foreign governments. Officials who favor disclosure for
reasons of their own will then have stronger legal support than they do today.
Yet these formal changes will not by themselves reverse the preponderant
incentives for secrecy inside the executive branch. It would be unrealistic to
expect that adoption of our proposals will automatically lead to dramatic
changes in official conduct.
In the final analysis, the impact of our system would largely depend on
the climate in which it was implemented. Official attitudes would change sub-
stantially if experience made it clear that unwarranted secrecy would not be
tolerated. Adoption of our proposals can have substantial impact, if those out-
side the executive branch are prepared to fight for release of the information
they need.
For Congress, this means persistence in demanding information and will-
ingness to use the power of the purse and other effective sanctions to enforce
that demand. Committees must tenaciously preserve their right to release in-
formation supplied to them by the executive branch, for otherwise their inde-
pendence is fatally compromised.
Private citizens, organized interest groups, and the press would each have
important roles to play. Informal demands for information can now be
pressed, if necessary, through the procedures of the Freedom of Information
Act. We are confident that the courts will conduct proceedings under the
Freedom of Information Act in an effective and responsible manner, in ful-
fillment of their congressional mandate.
The attitudes that once made the secrecy system impervious to criticism
have changed profoundly in recent years. We are heartened by the new read-
iness in all quarters to look behind the empty slogans of the Cold War. The
trend is toward increasing skepticism about secrecy, increasing respect for the
rule of law, and renewed faith in the free marketplace of ideas. In this cli-
mate, the kind of system we propose can be adopted and implemented with
success.
The struggle will not be easy, but we think the effort is worth making.
James Madison put it this way: "A people who mean to be their own Gover-
nors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives. ' ' 77
77. S. PADOVER, THE COMPLETE MADISON 337 (1953).
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